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THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF
COUNTY BOARDS IN INDIANA
By CLYDE F. SNIDER"
COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION
County government in Indiana centers, so far as it may be
said to have any center, in the board of county commissioners.
Although the constitution recognizes county boards as instru-
mentalities for the performance of public business,1 the board
of commissioners is a statutory, and not a constitutional,
agency. 2 The board consists of three members, one being
elected from each of the three commissioner districts into
which the county is divided, but all being elected by the voters
of the county at large.3  Like other county officers, commis-
sioners must, under the constitution, reside in the county dur-
ing their incumbency of office. The courts have held this re-
quirement to mean actual residence, and not merely residence
in the general legal sense. Thus, a commissioner who re-
moved with his family to Colorado and entered into busi-
ness there, was held to have forfeited his office, notwithstand-
ing his claim that his absence was of a temporary character
and the fact that he actually returned to attend most of the
regular meetings of the board. In such a case, the burden is
upon the official of proving that his absence from the county
is a mere temporary sojourn of a character which does not
operate to vacate the office. But while commissioners must
reside in the county, the mere removal of a commissioner
from the district for which he was elected to another dis-
trict within the same county does not operate to vacate his
*Member of Faculty University of Illinois, Department of Government.
lIn the provision (Art. VI, Sec. 10) that the General Assembly may con-
fer powers of a local, administrative character upon "the boards doing county
business in the several counties."
2 State v. Goldthait, 172 Ind. 210, 216, 87 N. E. 133 (1909).
3 1Burns' Annotated Indiana Statutes, 1933, secs. 26-601, 26-602.
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office. Although elected from a particular district, he does
not forfeit his office by removing from that district, providing
he continued to reside within the county.4
The term of office of county commissioners is three years,
one member of the board retiring and his successor taking
office on the first day of January of each year. 5 The statutes
provide that one commissioner shall be elected annually. In
practice, however, two are elected at each biennial election,
one being elected to take office on the first day of the succeed-
ing January and the other to take office a year later.6 In the
event that a vacancy occurs in the board's membership, ap-
pointment to fill the vacancy for the unexpired term is made
by the remaining members, the auditor casting the deciding
vote in case of a tie. Should a commissioner-elect die or
resign before the beginning of the term for which he was
elected, the commissioners in office fill the prospective vacancy
by electing some person to serve for the entire term. Two
members of the board constitute a quorum. 7
Although the statutes contain no provision with respect to
a presiding officer, the board, at the beginning of each year,
chooses one of its members to serve as president for that year.
The county auditor is ex officio clerk to the board and keeps
a record of its proceedings.8
DUAL CHARACTER
The board of county commissioners in Indiana possesses
a dual character, being, in the eyes of the law, both a Zor-
poration and a court.9 Each of these aspects of the board's
nature will be considered in turn.
4 Constitution of Indiana, Art. VI, Sec. 6, Smith v. State, 24 Ind. 101 (1865),
Relender v. State, 149 Ind. 283, 49 N. E. 30 (1898).
5 Burns, 1933, sec. 26-604, 49-207.
Ibid., sec. 26-603. Cf. Harold C. Feightner, Indiana County Government
(Indianapolis, 1932), p. 317
7Burns, 1933, sec. 26-601.
81bid., sec. 49-3004.
9 State v. Board of Commissioners, 45 Ind. 501 (1874), McCab v. Board
of Commissioners, 46 Ind. 380 (1874).
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Character as a Corporation
The commissioners in each county of the state are consti-
tuted by law a body politic and corporate. In its corporate
capacity, the board may sue and be sued; it also possesses
the rights, powers, and duties incident to corporations gen-
erally, so far as such rights, powers, and duties are not in-
consistent with the law creating the board or any other statute
relating thereto.10
The board of commissioners personifies the county; indeed,
in legal contemplation, the board is the county. "The county
is known in law only by its board of commissioners, and acts,
as a county, through its board.""1 Thus, during the period
when counties were held liable for failure to keep bridges
in repair,12 it was held by the courts that, since for legal pur-
poses the board is the county, action for damages in such
cases would be against the board, notwithstanding that it was
the county superintendent of roads, and not the county board,
who was charged by statute with seeing that the bridges were
properly repaired.'13
Action by the board on behalf of the county must be taken
when the board is legally in session and by the members act-
ing concurrently, the courts having held that the members of
the board cannot bind the county by acting successively and
separateIk. The board, like other corporations, is a continu-
ous body, which is not dissolved by one member going out of
office and an other coming in.14
Character as a Court
The judicial character of the county board is reminiscent
of those periods of territorial and state history when county
lOBurns, 1933, sec. 26-606; Sturgeon v. Board of Commissioners, 65 Ind.
302 (1879).
liBoard of Commissioners v. Wild, 37 Ind. App. 32, 35, 76 N. E. 256 (1905).
See also State v. Clark, 4 Ind. 315 (1853).
2 See supra, ch. II, "Liability of County and Township".
13 Patton v. Board of Commissioners, 96 Ind. 131 (1884).
14 Board of Commissioners v. Ross, 46 Ind. 404 (1874) ; Tombaugh v. Grogg,
146 Ind. 99, 44 N. E. 994 (1896).
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business was performed by the court of quarter sessions, the
court of common pleas, and boards of justices.'5 The county
board was regarded as a court at the time of the adoption of
the present constitution, 16 and it was doubtless in view of that
fact and the separation-of-powers theory that a provision was
included in that document which expressly authorized the con-
ferring of administrative powers upon "the boards doing
county business."' 17 The board is not only a court but a court
of record.' 8 It is authorized to punish contempts by fine or
imprisonment, and to enforce obedience to its orders by at-
tachment or other compulsory process.' 9 In counties having
a population of 110,000 or over a "bailiff of the county com-
missioners' court" is appointed by the board.20
Whether, in legal contemplation, the board of commission-
ers is to be regarded as primarily a court and only secondarily
a corporate administrative agency, or vice versa, is not quite
clear. In this connection, the recent case of Hastings v.
Board of Commissioners is of interest. A majority of the
members of the Supreme Court took the view, in that case,
that the board of county commissioners is a court belonging to
the judicial department of government, upon which certain
administrative powers have been conferred under constitu-
tional permission. More convincing, however, at least to the
writer, seems the dissenting opinion, in which it is held that
the board is not a court in the ordinary sense, having been
constituted as such neither by the constitution, nor by the
General Assembly under its power to establish "other courts."
According to this view the board is not to be considered as
"a court with certain administrative powers" but as "pri-
15See supra, ch. I.
1OSee State v. Board of Commissioners, 170 Ind. 595, 85 N. E. 513 (1908).
l7 Constitution of Indiana, Art. VI, Sec. 10.
18State v. Conner, 5 Blackf. 325 (1840), Board of Commissioners v. Cutler,
7 Ind. 6 (1855), Paul v. Walkerton Woodlawn Cemetery Assn., 204 Ind.
693, 184 N. E. 537 (1933).
l9 Burns, 1933, sec. 26-619. The punishment for contempt may not exceed
a fine of three dollars or imprisonment for twenty-four hours.
2 OBurns, 1933, secs. 26-612, 26-613.
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marily an administrative board with power to act judicially
in special instances. ' 21
SESSIONS
The statutes provide that the board shall hold regular
monthly sessions, beginning on the first Monday of the month
"and continuing only so long as the necessary business of
such session absolutely requires. ' 22  Under this provision,
as interpreted by the courts, it is for the board itself to de-
termine, in its discretion, when necessary business requires the
continuation of a session. By adjourning from day to day
or to a time certain the board may continue a regular session
until the close of the month, or, indeed, into the next calendar
month up to the first Monday thereof, at which time the next
regular session begins. This rule will even permit the con-
tinuing of a December term into January of the succeeding
calendar year. Thus, an order of a county board extending
the December, 1930, term to January 5, 1931, has been up-
held, action taken by the board during the first days of Janu-
ary being considered as action of the December term.2 3  An
adjourned meeting of any session operates as a continuation
of the original meeting, and any business that might have been
transacted at the original meeting may be transacted at the
adjourned meeting.24
In practice, the usual length of the regular session varies
widely as between counties, the longer sessions being found,
as a rule, in the more populous counties. In some counties,
two days ordinarily suffice for the disposition of the month's
business.25 In Marion County, on the other hand, the board,
21Hastings v. Board of Commissioners, 205 Ind. 687, 188 N. E. 207 (1933).
2 2 Burns, 1933, sec. 26-550.
2 3 Kraus v. Lehman, 170 Ind. 408, 83 N. E. 714, petition for rehearing 84
N. E. 769 (1908), State v. Eckman, 205 Ind. 550, 187 N. E. 327 (1933).
2 4Kraus v. Lehman, 170 Ind. 408, 83 N. E. 714, petition for rehearing, 84-
N. E. 769 (1908); Laird v. State, 200 Ind. 319, 163 N. E. 263 (1928). See
also, as to adjourned meetings, State v. Richey, 202 Ind. 116, 172 N. E. 119
(1930).
2 5See, for example, Annual Report of the Auditor of Wabash County, In-
diana, 1933.
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by adjournment, meets regularly on Monday, Wednesday,
and Friday of each week, and frequently on other days as
well, thus extending the session throughout the month.2 6 At
least some county boards designate certain days of the regular
session for the consideration of particular types of business.
Thus, Monday, the first day of the session, is set aside in
some counties for the consideration and allowance of claims
and is sometimes referred to as "bill day." Tuesday is some-
times set aside as "road and ditch day" for the consideration
of highway and drainage matters, and Wednesday for visiting
the poor asylum and jail.2 7  In actual practice, however, it
seems that this order of business is followed only in a very
general way. The allowance of claims often consumes more
than a single day, and, on the other hand, constituents desir-
ing to present other business to the board on "bill day" are
likely to be accorded a hearing.
Special sessions of the board may be called, whenever the
public interest so requires, by the auditor, by the clerk of the
circuit court in case of the death or disqualification of the
auditor, or by the recorder in case of the disqualification of
both the auditor and the clerk; the determination of the
auditor, or other officer calling the session, that the public
interest requires special session, is final and conclusive.28 Spe-
cial sessions are limited to the transaction of business specified
in the call therefor, 29 and the courts have deduced certain
limitations upon the type of business which may, under any
circumstances, be considered by the board when in special
session. At one time the rule was followed that no business
of a judicial character, where notice is required and there are
conflicting claims or interests to be adjusted, might be trans-
acted at a special session. Thus it was held, in 1880, that an
26County Commissioners' Record, Marion County, Indiana.
2 7 See Annual Report of the County Auditor of Howard County, Indiana,
1915, Annual Report of the Auditor of Wabash County, Indiana, 1931.
2 8Burns, 1933, sec. 26-607; Wilson v. Board of Commissioners, 68 Ind.
507 (1879), Jussen v. Board of Commissioners, 95 Ind. 567 (1884).
29Burns, 1933, sec. 26-610. Literally, this limitation seems to apply only
to special sessions called by the auditor.
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order for the annexation of contiguous territory to an in-
corporated city could not be made by the board at a special
session, on the ground that this was not ordinary county busi-
ness but rather "a special statutory proceeding wherein notice
is required, and where there may be adversary proceedings
requiring judicial investigation and judgment."80  Five years
later the rule as to what business may, and what may not, be
transacted at special sessions, was stated by the Supreme
Court as follows:
"Where there are adversary proceedings of a judicial character, and
notice is required, the judicial functions must be exercised at a regular
session of the board of commissioners; but where the business is of an
administrative or ministerial character, it may be lawfully transacted
at a special session properly convened." 31
In 1888, however, the rule of absolute prohibition was modi-
fied to permit the transaction of judicial business at a special
session if the statutes expressly authorizes such transaction.
Finally, in 1894, it was held that proceedings where notice
is required may be considered at a special session if the con-
text of the statute and the nature of the proceedings dearly
indicate that it was the intent of the legislature that they
should be so considered. 32  It appears, therefore, that the
present rule, dating from 1894, permits the transaction at
special sessions of any business of an administrative character,
provided that it is properly specified in the call for the ses-
sion, but forbids the transaction at special sessions of business
of a judicial nature unless its transaction is authorized by
statute, either expressly or by reasonable implication.
It will be noted that the cases just discussed evince a con-
sistent trend toward liberality in the court's decisions relative
3OCity of Vincennes v. Windman, 72 Ind. 218, 219 (1380).
3iPlatter v. Board of Commissioners, 103 Ind. 360, 372, 2 N. E. 544 (1885).
For a general discussion of the distinction made by the courts between the
judicial and the administrative functions of the board of commissioners, see
infra, "Administrative Acts and Judicial Acts".
32Prezinger v. Harness, 114 Ind. 491, 16 N. E. 495 (1888), Hufford v.
Conover, 139 Ind. 151, 38 N. E. 328 (1894).
INDIANA LA9W JOURNAL
to the kinds of business which may be transacted at special
sessions. It should be pointed out, however, that all of those
cases were decided during a period when regular sessions of
the board occurred only quarterly and were strictly limited by
statute as to their maximum length. Under the present sys-
tem of regular monthly sessions which may be extended
throughout the month by adjournment, the necessity for spe-
cial sessions is greatly lessened and hence the significance of
restrictions upon those sessions is correspondingly reduced.
During the year of 1935, only four special sessions of the
commissioners were held in Monroe County and only one
was held in Fountain County.3 a In Marion County, due to
the practice of continuing the regular session throughout the
month by adjournment, there were no special sessions. 84
The procedure followed in board meetings is, in most in-
stances, extremely informal, little attention being given to'the
fundamental principles-much less to the niceties-of par-
liamentary law. It is not uncommon, while the board is in
session, to find various officials and citizens engaging different
board members in conversation simultaneously. Indeed, due
to the general confusion and hubbub, it is frequently impos-
sible for a visitor entering the chamber of the "commission-
ers' court" to determine whether the board is in formal ses-
sion or in recess.
, The sheriff is required to attend meetings of the county
board, either personally or by deputy, and to execute the
board's orders. Board meetings are open to the public.35
COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS
Members of the board of county commissioners receive an
annual salary which is fixed by statute and depends, as do
county salaries in general, upon the "population and neces-
S3One "adjourned meeting" was held in Monroe County and several such
meetings were held in Fountain County. County Commissioners' Record,
Fountain County, Indiana, data for Monroe County supplied by Dr. Pressly
S. Sikes, Department of Government, Indiana University.
84 County Commissioners' Record, Marion County, Indiana.
3 5 Burns, 1933, secs. 26-611, 26-623.
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sary services required" in the county.386 The salary varies
from $100 in the least populous county of the state (Ohio
County) to $1,920 in the six most populous counties (Ma-
rion, Lake, St. Joseph, Allen, Vanderburgh, and Vigo). In
addition to their salaries, commissioners are allowed mile-
age at the rate of six cents per mile for the distance neces-
sarily traveled in the conduct of county business."
LIMITED NATURE OF POWERS
The board of commissioners is a creature of statute and
possesses no powers other than those conferred upon it by
statute, either expressly or by necessary implication. In ap-
plying this principle, the courts have held that the board could
not, in the absence of statutory authority, maintain an action
in the courts to vacate its order accepting a public improve-
ment constructed by contract, even though it appeared that
the order had been procured by fraud. 88 Likewise, it has
been decided that, without a statute granting such authority,
the board could not lease rooms in the courthouse to be used
for private purposes. 39 Again, in the making of contracts the
powers of the board are strictly limited; it enjoys no general
power, because of its corporate character, of entering into
contracts of all kinds, but possesses only such powers to con-
tract as it derives from statute.40 Acts done by the board in
excess of its authority are void.41
36Ibid., sec. 49-1003. This basis of classification for the purpose of fixing
the compensation of officers is expressly authorized by constitutional provision.
Constitution of Indiana, Art. IV, Sec. 22.
37Burns, 1933, secs. 49-1004, 49-1013. No mileage is allowed, however,
on trips between the commissioners' homes and the courthouse, and not more
than one mileage is allowed for one conveyance although transporting more
than one person.
3 8 Sullivan v. Board of Commissioners, 85 Ind. App. 287, 149 N. E. 94-
(1925). See also Gavin v. Board of Commissioners, 104 Ind. 201, 3 N. E.
846 (1885).
39State v. Hart, 144 Ind. 107, 43 N. E. 7 (1896). The authority here in
question is now granted by statute. Burns, 1933, see. 26-1805.
4 OState v. Goldthait, 172 Ind. 210, 87 N. E. (1909). See infra, "Func-
tions-Making of Contracts"
41Cincinnati, I. & W. R. Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 192 Ind. 1, 134
N. E. 782 (1922).
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Not only is the board of commissioners confined, in its
activities, to the exercise of the powers granted by statute,
but the courts have insisted upon a strict interpretation of
those powers. It has been held, for instance, that where it
is the clear intent of a statute authorizing the incurring of
indebtedness that interest should be paid annually, the board
cannot issue bonds with interest payable semi-annually. 42
Moreover, where the statutes prescribes the procedure to be
followed in the performance of any activity, the board must
adhere to that procedure or its action will be held invalid.
Where, for instance, the statutes prescribe the procedure to
be followed by the board in letting contracts for the con-
struction of bridges, and where a company builds a bridge
at the order of the board but without the statutory require-
ments being complied with, the company cannot recover from
the county, notwithstanding the fact that the county may
have received full value for the services performed and may
actually be using the new bridge. 43
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS AND JUDICIAL ACTS
In keeping with the dual status of the board as both a cor-
poration and a judicial tribunal, the courts have distinguished
between two types of function performed by that body-the
one administrative in character and the other judicial. 44 As
is usual in such matters, the courts have attempted no com-
prehensive classification of the various functions of the board
on this basis, but, in deciding particular cases, have assigned
certain functions to each of the respective categories. Among
the functions of the board which have been classed as ad-
4 2 English v. Smock, 34 Ind. 115 (1870). For another instance of strict
interpretation, see Hamilton v. McMahel, 80 Ind. App. 473, 141 N. E. 469
(1923).
43 Rexford v. Board of Commissioners, 85 Ind. App. 281, 151 N. E. 830
(1926). See also Platter v. Board of Commissioners, 103 Ind. 360, 2 N. E.
544 (1885).
4 4The non-judicial functions are referred to occasionally as being of a
"legislative" character and again as being of a "ministerial" nature. One
looks in vain for a standard terminology in the judicial decisions relating to
such matters.
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ministrative are those of: examining and allowing claims
against the county ;4 5 making contracts ;46 and acting upon
petitions for the relocation of county seats.47 On the other
hand, the board acts judicially when it passes upon the pub-
lic utility of proposed drainage or highway projects.48
The distinction between the judicial and the administrative
acts of the board is not always dear, nor is the basis upon
which the distinction is made. The basis of distinction was
recently considered in the case of Hastings v. Board of Com-
missioners, previously referred to,49 which case concerned the
removal from office of a county highway superintendent under
a statute which provided that the superintendent should be
appointed by the county board for a four-year term but should
be removable by the board "after a hearing for incom-
petency, malfeasance or neglect of duties." The immediate
question presented was that as to whether the board of com-
missioners, in removing the highway superintendent, was per-
forming an act of a judicial character from which appeal
would lie to the circuit court. In holding that the board
acted judicially in the matter, a majority of the members of
the Supreme Court declared that "If the final conclusion of
a proceeding permits the board to exercise a discretion, it
will be judicial, but when the final act or duty is imposed by
law there is no discretion and the act or duty is ministerial."
The principle seemingly enunciated here, viz., that every act
of the board involving the exercise of discretion is judicial,
was vigorously assailed in the dissenting opinion, the two dis-
senting judges taking the view that the board, in removing
the superintendent, was performing a duty incidental to the
management of the county's highway system, and that the
4 5 Board of Commissioners v. Heaston, 144 Ind. 583, 41 N. E. 457 (1895),
Sudbury v. Board of Commissioners, 157 Ind. 446, 62 N. E. 45 (1901) ; Board
of Commissioners v. Trautman, 204 Ind. 362, 184 N. E. 178 (1933).
46Board of Commissioners v. Gillies, 138 Ind. 667, 38 N. E. 40 (1894),
Kraus v. Board of Commissioners, 39 Ind. App. 624, 80 N. E. 544 (1907).
4 7Hall v. Kincaid, 64- Ind. App. 103, 115 N. E. 361 (1917).
48Bryan v. Moore, 81 Ind. 9 (1881); Meehan v. Wiles, 93 Ind. 52 (1884);
Forrey v. Board of Commissioners, 189 Ind. 257, 126 N. E. 673 (1920).
4 9 Supra, "Rual Character-Character as a Court".
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action was administrative rather than judicial in character.
"When," the dissenting opinion declares, "an act is required
of the county commissioners as an administrative board, such
act is not judicial even though its performance may require
the exercise of judgment and discretion." It was also pointed
out by the dissenting members of the court that to hold that
the board was acting judicially in discharging the superin-
tendent would be to hold that the board was both- party liti-
gant and judge in the case-a situation quite inconsistent
with American standards of justice.50
As between the two opinions in this case, it seems to the
writer that the dissent is the stronger from the dual stand-
point of logic and precedent, notwithstanding the fact that the
majority opinion cites authority to the effect that the act of
removing public officers under statutes such as the one here
in question is considered in certain other states as being ju-
dicial in its nature. It is quite generally recognized by stu-
dents of public law and administration that administrative
activities very often involve discretion. Moreover, in pre-
vious decisions, the courts of Indiana have held various func-
tions of the county board which clearly involve discretion-
e. g., those of allowing claims and letting contracts-to be
administrative in character. It thus seems that final ac-
ceptance of the doctrine of the majority opinion would neces-
sitate a reversal of numerous past decisions and a general
reclassification of the functions performed by boards of com-
missioners. In this connection it is significant to note that,
in the subsequent case of Board of Commissioners v. Wood-
ward, which involved the same question as that in the Hast-
ings case, the Appellate Court followed the majority opinion
in the Hastings case only because a majority of the Appellate
Court judges felt that they had no alternative but to follow
the previous ruling of the Supreme Court. Although decid-
ing the Woodward case on authority of the Hastings case, the
majority members of the Appellate Court declared: "We
5 OHastings v. Board of Commissioners, 205 Ind. 687, 695, 699, 188 N. E.
207 (1933).
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have read the dissenting opinion in that [Hastings] case,
and considered it a well-reasoned opinion, but this court is
bound by the majority opinion, regardless of the merits of
the dissenting opinion." 51  Moreover, one member of the
Appellate Court was bold enough to dissent on the ground
that the doctrine of the dissenting opinion in the Hastings
case should be the law. Considering this feeling on the part
of the Appellate Court judges, together with the logical dis-
sent in the Hastings case, it seems not unlikely that the doc-
trine of the majority opinion in the latter case may ultimately
be overruled."2
Having considered the general nature of the distinction
between administrative and judicial activities of the board and
having noted some examples of each, there remains for con-
sideration the practical significance of the distinction. In this
connection, it is to be noted that there are several respects in
which the two types of function are not on the same foot-
ing, different rules being applied by the courts to the respect-
ive types.
In the first place, when the board acts judicially its action,
to be of any effect, must be shown by its record, whereas
action of an administrative character may be shown in some
other manner, even by parol.53 The commissioners' court,
as a court of record, can speak only by its record. 54 No such
51Board of Commissioners v. Woodward, 194- N. E. 735, 737 (Appellate
Court of Indiana, 1935).
5 2The fundamental question involved in the Hastings and Woodward cases,
viz., that of the proper distinction between the judicial and the administrative
functions of the board, continues to be of importance notwithstanding the fact
that the particular office there involved-that of county highway superin-
tendent-was abolished in 1933. Laws of Indiana, 1933, ch. 19. The in-
cumbent of the present office of county highway supervisor, the establish-
ment of which is optional with the respective counties, serves at the pleasure
of the board of commissioners. Burns, 1933, see. 36-1110.
53Eder v. Kreiter, 40 Ind. App. 542, 82 N. E. 552 (1907); Paul v. Walker-
ton Woodlawn Cemetery Assn., 204 Ind. 693, 184 N. E. 537 (1933), McCabe
v. Board of Commissioners, 46 Ind. 380 (1874).
G4State v. Conner, 5 BIackf. 325 (1840), Board of Commissioners v. Cutler,
7 Ind. 6 (1855); Paul v. Walkerton Woodlawn Cemetery Assn., 204 Ind.
693, 184- N. E. 537 (1933). The board has the power to correct or supply
its records by nunc pro tunc entries, and a presumption will be indulged in
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rule applies, however, to the board when its acts as an ad-
ministrative agency, it having been held, for example, that a
parol employment, at a legal session of the board, of an
attorney to defend a suit against the county, was valid and
binding upon the county.55
In the second place, in the case of judicial action, appeal
from the board's decision regularly lies to the courts, unless
denied by statute; in the case of administrative action, how-
ever, appeal does not lie to the courts unless granted by stat-
ute. 56 In the third place, mandamus will lie to compel the
board to perform a specific administrative duty required of
that body by statute, but will not lie to control the action of
the board when it is acting in a judicial capacity.57 A fourth
distinction lies in the fact, already noted in a previous sec-
tion, that, while any business of an administrative nature may
be transacted at a special session of the board if specified in
the call for the session, judicial business may be considered
in special session only by statutory authorization, express or
implied.58 These legal distinctions between the judicial ac-
tivities of the board and its administrative activities are indi-
cated in tabular form in Table I.
FUNCTIONS
Control of County Property
The board of commissioners is vested with the control of
county property. The property most commonly belonging to
counties consists of the courthouse with its appurtenant
grounds, the poor asylum, and the jail. As will appear later,
favor of such entries. Kraus v. Lehman, 170 Ind. 408, 83 N. E. 714, petition
for rehearing 84 N. E. 769 (1908), Tombaugh v. Grogg, 146 Ind. 99, 44
N. E. 994 (1896).
55McCabe v. Board of Commissioners, 46 Ind. 380 (1874).
56See infra, "Appeal from Decisions of Board".
57 Hawkins v. Board of Commissioners, 14 Ind. 521 (1860), Board of Com-
missioners v. State, 189 Ind. 540, 128 N. E. 596 (1920). Mandamus will not
lie to control the board in the exercise of any discretionary power, whether
judicial or administrative.
58 See supra, "Sessions."
COUNTY BOARDS IN INDIANA
however, some counties own other property of various kinds.
The board may purchase or sell county property, subject to
the requirement that the purchase or sale of real estate valued
at one thousand dollars or more must have the approval of
the county council. Except in certain extraordinary cases,
however, the commissioners may sell county property only at
public auction and after advertisement as prescribed by stat-
ute. The board is authorized to make, in conformity with
TABLE I.
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
BUSINESS OF BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS
Judicial Business
1. Keeping of record.
2. Appeal to Courts
from Decisions.
3. Control by man-
damus.
4. Transactions at Spe-
cial Session.
Essential to validity of
action.
Lies unless denied by
statute.
Not subject to control.
May be transacted only
when transaction is
authorized by statute
and when specified in
call.
Admznistrative Business
Not essential to validity
of action.
Lies only when granted
by statute.
May be compelled to
perform ministerial
duties.
May be transacted if
specified in call.
the statutes, orders respecting the care of county property,
and, subject to certain restrictions, to grant licenses, permits,
or franchises with respect to the use of such property.5 9
Auditing and Allowing of Claims Against County,
One of the chief duties of the board of commissioners is
that of examining into the merits of all claims presented
against the county, and of allowing such claims in whole or
5 9 Burns, 1933, sec. 26-2008; Laws of Indiana, 1935, ch. 7. See infra, "The
County Council-Authorizing Sale and Purchase of Real Estate."
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in part, or rejecting them, as the commissioners in their dis-
cretion may deem just.60 In its function of allowing claims,
the board acts in much the same capacity as does the board of
directors of a private corporation in auditing claims against
the company. 61 Due to the large number of claims presented,
the commissioners usually find it impossible to examine per-
sonally the individual merits of all claims presented. There-
fore, although the regular session of the board is normally
devoted in large part to the work of auditing claims, the
action of the board can be little more, in most instances, than
a more or less perfunctory approval of the recommendations
of the auditor, who has previously gone over the claims in
preparing the business to come before the board. Claims
must be filed with the auditor at least five days before the
first day of the session at which they are to be allowed, 62
the form for their statement being prescribed by the State
Board of Accounts. The typical procedure in the auditing
of claims is for the auditor, who has already examined the
claims and noted his recommendations thereon, to pass the
claims one by one to the president of the board, who passes
them on to the second member and he, in turn, to the third.
The decision of the board as to whether the claim is to be
allowed, and, if so, in what amount, is noted thereon and the
commissioners affix their signatures in places provided for
that purpose.63
Since the county board is a mere creature of statute, it has
no power to allow any claim unless the expenditure involved
is authorized by statute. In the event that the board allows
a claim without such authorization, its action is unlawful and
void and any payment made on a claim so allowed may be
6OBurns, 1933, secs. 26-805, 26-807, Laws of Indiana, 1935, ch. 7. With re-
spect to restrictions upon this power, see Burns, 1933, secs. 26-533, 26-538,
26-539, 26-806, 26-809.
61 See Tucker v. State, 163 Ind. 403, 416, 71 N. E. 140 (1904).
62 Burns, 1933, sec. 26-806. See also ibid., sec. 26-538.
63 Rubber stamps are sometimes used by board members to expedite the
task of signing. Since the board acts by majority vote, the approval of two
members, as evidenced by their signatures, is sufficient for the allowance of
a claim.
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recovered by the county.64 Thus, it has been held that the
action of the board, in allowing a claim for expenses incurred
by the superintendent of the county asylum in attending meet-
ings of state and national charity organizations, was illegal
and void, even though the board had instructed the super-
intendent to attend such meetings and his attendance had been
requested by the Board of State Charities, where no statute
made it the superintendent's duty to attend the meetings or
provided for the payment of his expenses. 65 The allowance
of a claim by the board is not a judicial determination of its
validity, the finding of the board being no more than prima
facie evidence of the correctness of the claim. 6
It should be noted that the presentation of claims to the
board of county commissioners for allowance or disallowance
is a condition precedent to the bringing of suit upon such
claims in the courts. Every claim must first be presented to
the board, to the end that useless litigation may be avoided.
When, however, a claim is disallowed, in its entirety or in
part, by the board, the claimant has the option, under the
statutes, of appealing to the courts from the board's decision
or instituting an original action against the county.67
Making of Contracts
The board of commissioners, as the general governing body
of the county, is the agency entrusted with the making of
contracts on the county's behalf. Like other powers of the
board, its power of entering into contracts is strictly limited
in its nature. The courts have held that the board "can not
make contracts of all descriptions and for all purposes for
64 Board of Commissioners v. Heaston, 144 Ind. 583, 41 N. E. 457 (1895),
Eder v. Kreiter, 40 Ind. App. 542, 82 N. E. 552 (1907).
65 Lake County v. Neuenfeldt, 78 Ind. App. 566, 136 N. E. 580 (1922).
66 Sudbury v. Board of Commissioners, 157 Ind. 446, 62 N. E. 45 (1901),
Gross v. Board of Commissioners, 158 Ind. 531, 64 N. E. 25 (1902).
67 Sudbury v. Board of Commissioners, 157 Ind. 446, 62 N. E. 45 (1901),
Mueller v. Board of Commissioners, 73 Ind. App. 196, 127 N. E. 15 (1920).
See also Base Foundry and Machine Works v. Board of Commissioners, 115
Ind. 234, 17 N. E. 593 (1888).
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which natural persons may. It will be confined in making
contracts to the powers expresgly granted to it by the act of
its creation, and to the implied powers incidental and neces-
sary to the execution of such expressed powers and the per-
formance of the duties enjoined upon it.''6 The rule is well
established that the board cannot bind the county by any
contract which is beyond the scope of its powers.69 Thus,
it has been held that, their employment by the board being
ultra vires, attorneys engaged to assist in the prosecution of
persons charged with crime could not recover from the county
for their services, this being true even where the charge
against the defendant was the embezzlement of county
funds.70  While contracts made by the board are ordinarily
in writing, the board may, in certain cases, bind the county by
parol contracts. 71
The board is charged with letting contracts for the pur-
chase of materials and supplies for all county offices, and for
the construction of county buildings and other public improve-
ments. 72  There is a tendency on the part of the General
Assembly to require to an ever-increasing extent, that county
contracts be let on the basis of open competitive bidding. As
recently as 1935 this requirement was extended to the pur-
chase of tools and materials to be used in the repair and main-
tenance of highways, total purchases up to $350 per month in
each county still being excepted, however, from the require-
ment.73  Statutes requiring that contracts be let on the basis
of competitive bidding usually prescribe with some exactness
the procedure to be followed. Failure to comply with the
procedural requirements renders a contract void, and injunc-
68 Hight v. Board of Commissioners, 68 Ind. 575, 577 (1879).
69 Driftwood Valley Turnpike Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 72 Ind. 226
(1880), Board of Commissioners v. Bradford, 72 Ind. 455, 37 Am. Rep. 174
(1880).
70 Board of Commissioners v. Ward, 69 Ind. 441 (1880). See also Hight
v. Board of Commissioners, 68 Ind. 575 (1879).
71 McCabe v. Board of Commissioners, 46 Ind. 380 (1874), Board of Com-
missioners v. Ritter, 90 Ind. 362 (1883).
72 Burns, 1933, secs. 26-536, 26-2001-26-2009, 53-104--53-106.
78 Laws of Indiana, 1935, ch. 145.
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tion will lie to prevent the board from carrying out its pro-
visions. 7
4
Although the statutes prescribing the methods of letting
contracts vary in detail, their general features are fairly uni-
form. The county board is usually required to prepare speci-
fications of the commodities to be purchased or work to be
performed, together with plans, drawings, or models, if neces-
sary or desirable, and to place these on file in the auditor's
office for public inspection. Notice is then given by publica-
tion in newspapers of general circulation that the specifications
are on file for examination and that sealed bids will be re-
ceived up to a certain date. The board, after examination of
the bids submitted, is required to award the contract to "the
lowest responsible bidder," or, in some instances, "the lowest
and best responsible bidder." 75 The right is usually reserved
to the board, however, to reject any or all bids, if they are
unsatisfactory, and to readvertise for new bids. By the terms
of the County Reform Law, the board of commissioners can
make no valid contract unless money for the particular pur-
pose involved has previously been appropriated by the county
council.7 6
Quite often the board of commissioners finds it necessary
or desirable to make contracts the execution of which will
extend beyond the time at which there is a change in the per-
sonnel of the board. As a general rule such contracts, if
made in good faith, are valid. The courts, however, have
made an interesting exception to this rule in holding invalid,
as contrary to public policy, a contract for the employment
74 Board of Commissioners v. Gillies, 138 Ind. 667, 38 N. E. 40 (1894).
75 The courts have held that provisions of this nature vest some discretion
in the board in determining the bidder to whom the contract shall be awarded.
Ness v. Board of Commissioners, 178 Ind. 221, 98 N. E. 33, petition for re-
hearing 98 N. E. 1002 (1912); Eigenmann v. Board of Commissioners, 53
Ind. App. 1, 101 N. E. 38 (1913). For a case on this point involving town-
ship contracts, see Lee v. Browning, 96 Ind. App. 282, 182 N. E. 550 (1932),
discussed infra, ch. VII, "The Advisory Board-Approving Contracts."
706Burns, 1933, sec. 26-525. See Ness v. Board of Commissioners, 178 Ind.
221, 98 N. E. 33, petition for rehearing 98 N. E. 1002 (1912); State v. Board
of Commissioners, 204 Ind. 484, 184 N. E. 780 (1933), Lund v. Board of
Commissioners, 47 Ind. App. 175, 93 N. E. 179 (1910).
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of a county attorney for a term extending beyond the time
when a change in the board's membership would occur.77  It
is to be noted, however, that this exception to the general
rule is made upon the theory that, because of the intimate
and confidential nature of the relationship between attorney
and client, it is highly desirable that the board, as organized
from year to year, have a free hand in selecting its legal
adviser. This peculiar relationship not existing in the case
of other county employees, their contracts of employment
are binding upon the board regardless of subsequent changes
in its personnel. 78
Establishment and Maintenance of Jail and Poor Asylum
The statutes provides that the board of commissioners of
each county shall establish and maintain a county jail, and
an asylum to which indigent persons who have become perm-
anent public charges may be removed by township overseers
of the poor. 79 As a matter of fact, however, two counties
do not maintain jails at the present time but keep their pris-
oners in the jails of neighboring counties.80 By an act of 1933,
the county board is authorized, if the poor asylum contains
a population of ten or less, to discontinue such asylum; to
sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of the property relating
thereto; and to contract with the board of commissioners
of some other county for the care of the poor persons of
the county discontinuing its asylum.81 However, no county
has as yet discontinued its asylum under the provisions of this
act. The county board is authorized to appoint a "board
of visitors" to visit the county asylum and report thereon,
and is itself required to visit and inspect the asylum at least
once every- three months.82
Construction and Maintenance of Roads and Bridges
One of the most important functional activities of the
county board is that with respect to roads and bridges. The
77 Jessup v. Hinchman, 77 Ind. App. 460, 133 N. E. 853 (1922). See also
Board of Commissioners v. Taylor, 123 Ind. 148, 23 N. E. 752 (1890).
78 See Board of Commissioners v. Shields, 130 Ind. 6, 29 N. E. 385 (1891).
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various laws providing for the construction of highways by
the county are administered directly by the board, which re-
ceives petitions for the construction of particular projects,
orders the improvements established after prescribed legal
formalities have been complied with, and awards the contracts
for construction. Maintenance and repairs of roads and
bridges are under the supervision and control of the board,
although in direct charge of either the county surveyor or
a highway supervisor appointed by and responsible to the
board.8 3
Exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain
When the county, under the power of eminent domain
conferred upon it by statute, seeks to acquire private prop-
erty for some public use, condemnation proceedings are insti-
tuted in the circuit court by the board of county commis-
sioners. Although occasionally authorized and employed for
other purposes, the power of eminent domain is most fre-
quently invoked by the county for the purpose of acquiring
real estate for the erection of a courthouse, jail, poor asylum,
or other county building, or for the opening, widening, or
straightening of county highways.8 4
Functions With Respect to Elections
The board of commissioners participates in various ways
in the conduct of elections. The more important functions
of the board in that connection are those of: establishing
election precincts and changing their boundaries; providing
rooms for polling places and equipping them with voting
boothes; and providing ballot boxes and/or voting machines
for the several precincts.
79 Burns, 1933, sec. 13-1001, Laws of Indiana, 1935, ch. 116, sees. 3, S.
80 See infra, ch. IX, "Correction-The County Jail"
81 Burns, 1933, sec. 52-215. As to the population of the poor asylums. see
infra, ch. IX, "The County Asylum-Asylum Population."
82Burns, 1933, secs. 52-206, 52-217.
83Burns, 1933, sees. 52-301-52-328.
84 See Burns, 1933, secs. 26-2101-26-2106, 36-303, 59401, Laws of Indiana
1935, ch. 94.
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Appotntment of Certain County Officers and Employees
Although the board of commissioners possesses no general
power to appoint and remove county officers, it does appoint
certain officers, boards, and commissions, some of which exist
or are authorized in all counties and others in only a part
of the counties of the state. Some of these are appointed
for a definite term, while others serve at the pleasure of the
board. The more important of these functionaries are the
following- county health officer (appointed with approval of
the State Board of Health) ; county physician; county attor-
ney; superintendent of county asylum; county highway super-
visor; county veterinarian; board of hospital trustees; board
of managers of tuberculosis hospitals; superintendent of
county insane asylum; superintendent of county workhouse;
bailiff of the commissioners' court; purchasing agent; bridge
commissioner; county inspector of weights and measures (ap-
pointed with approval of the State Commissioner of Weights
and Measures) ; miners' examination board; three members
of the county library board;85 three memorial trustees; and
four members of the county planning commission 0
It is also the prerogative of the board to appoint certain
minor county employees, the number and nature of which
vary from county to county. Examples of such employees
are the custodian, matrons, and janitors of the courthouse
and the custodian of the courthouse grounds.
Functions With Respect to Township Government
There are certain connecting links between county and
township government, notwithstanding the fact that the gov-
ernments of the two units are, in most respects, quite inde-
pendent of each other. The more important functions of
85 When the county contributes to the support of a city or town library, the
board of county commissioners appoints two members of the governing board
of such library. Burns, 1933, sec. 41-514.
86 The board also designates one of its own members to serve on the
planning commission.
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the board of county commissioners which pertain to township
government are those of: dividing the county into townships
and, subject to certain restrictions, consolidating townships
or altering their boundaries; hearing and deciding appeals
by persons denied poor relief by township trustees; fixing,
within statutory limitations, the number of justices of the
peace to be elected in each township; and filling vacancies in
township offices.87
Miscellaneous Functions88
Numerous other powers and duties are conferred by statute
upon the board of county commissioners in some or all of the
counties of the state. In some instances the statutes merely
confer permissive powers while in others they impose manda-
tory duties. While most of the permissive statutes confer
complete authority upon the board to act on its own initiative,
a substantial number prescribe certain essential conditions pre-
cedent to action by the board, such as petition by the voters
or freeholders, favorable vote at an election, or a combina-
tion of petition and election. In a few instances the board
is free to act on its own initiative but is required to act upon
proper petition and/or vote.
Subject, in some instances, to qualifications of the types
just referred to, the board is authorized, in some or all coun-
ties of the state, to: (1) establish a county hospital; (2)
establish a county tuberculosis hospital; (3) establish a county
orphan asylum, either individually or jointly with contiguous
county or counties; (4) provide a house for the accommoda-
tion of children who are under custody of the board of chil-
dren's guardians or the juvenile court; (5) establish a county
library; (6) execute bounty bonds, notes, or other evidences
of indebtedness when the county borrows money; (7) ap-
87 See Burns, 1933, secs. 5-101, 26-701-26-705, 49-405, 49-406, 65-106; Laws
of Indiana, 1935, ch. 116, see. 17.
88 With respect to joint functions of the board of commissioners and county
council, see infra, "The County Council-Functions Shared with County
Board."
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prove the number of deputies and assistants to be appointed
by the various county officers, within limits fixed by law; (8)
fix the dog tax within the county at an amount above the
minimum prescribed by statute; (9) establish drainage pro-
jects, where the proposed work and the land affected thereby
are entirely within one county; (So0) receive petitions for the
incorporation of towns and, upon approval of incorporation
by the voters of the territory affected by such a petition, enter
an order declaring that the town has been incorporated; (11)
approve the official bonds of various county officers; (12)
fill vacancies in county offices, except where otherwise pro-
vided by statute; and (13) serve ex officio as a county board
of finance.89
The list here presented might be extended almost indefi-
nitely and is merely offered as being suggestive of the variety
of powers and duties devolved upon the board by the Gen-
eral Assembly.
Appeal From Decisions of Board
The statutes provide that any person aggrieved by any
decision of the board of county commissioners may appeal
therefrom to the circuit court. 0° While the statutory language
thus appears upon its face to be universal in its scope, the
courts have held that this grant of a general right of appeal
applies only to decisions of the board when that body is
acting in a judicial capacity, and that appeal will lie from
decisions of an administrative nature only if expressly granted
by statute. This rule has been succinctly stated by the Supreme
Court as follows:
"Where the duty of the commissioners involves judicial action, an
appeal lies from its [sic] judgment, unless the right of appeal is denied
89 Burns, 1933, secs. 16-303, 22-2601, 22-2805, 22-3215, 22-3216, 22-3301,
26-540, 27-104 ff, 41-510, 48-101---48-109, 49-123, 49405, Laws of Indiana,
1935, chs. 70, 84.
90 Burns, 1933, see. 26-901. Italics are mine. Concurrent jurisdiction over
such appeals has quite generally been conferred upon the superior courts in the
counties where such courts have been established.
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expressly or by necessary implication from the statute creating the duty.
Where that duty does not involve judicial action, but consists in the
performance of administrative, ministerial or discretionary powers, no
appeal lies from such action, unless it is expressly authorized by
statute."91
In practice, appeal is frequently granted by statute with
respect to administrative matters-for example, from the
action of the board in allowing claims. 2 Appeal from a de-
cision of the board must betaken within thirty days, by filing
the proper appeal bond with the county auditor. 93 Even
a person who was not a party to the proceeding before the
board may appeal from the board's decision if he is aggrieved
thereby. In such case, the appellant must file with the auditor,
in addition to the appeal bond required of all appellants, an
affidavit in which he sets forth the nature of his interest in
the matter decided and his contention that he is aggrieved
by the decision.94
When an appeal is taken, the auditor makes a transcript
of the proceedings before the board, which transcript he de-
livers, together with pertinent papers and documents and the
appeal bond, to the clerk of the court to which the appeal
is taken. The court tries the case de novo, the order of the
board being suspended during pendency of the appeal. Upon
conclusion of the trial, the court may make a final determina-
tion of the proceedings and cause its judgment to be executed,
or may remand the case to the board with instructions as
to further proceedings.95
91 Board of Commissioners v. Davis, 136 Ind. 503, 505, 36 N. E. 141 (1894).
See also Hanna v. Board of Commissioners, 29 Ind. 170 (1867); Platter v.
Board of Commissioners, 103 Ind. 360, 2 N. E. 544 (1885), Hastings v. Board
of Commissioners, 205 Ind. 687, 188 N. E. 207 (1933).
92 Burns, 1933, see. 26-820.
93 Ibid., see. 26-902.
94 Ibid., see. 26-901. See Holman v. Robbins, 5 Ind. App. 436, 31 N. E.
863 (1892).
95 Burns, 1933, secs. 26-903, 26-907; Barnes v. Wagener, 169 Ind. 511, 82
N. E. 1037 (1907). See also Souder v. Tyner, 189 Ind. 386, 127 N. E. 273
(1920).
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II
THE COUNTY COUNCIL
Indiana is one of the few states in which the financial
power of the county does not rest with the county adminis-
trative board but has been placed in the hands of some other
authority.9 Prior to 1899, this state followed the customary
practice of vesting the board of county commissioners with
both administrative powers and the control of finance. How-
ever, widespread extravagance and inefficiency during the lat-
ter half of the nineteenth century led to the enactment, in
1899, of the County Reform Law, an act which created the
county council and vested in that body the exclusive power
of levying county taxes, making appropriations, authorizing
the borrowing of money, and approving the purchase or sale
of real estate of the value of one thousand dollars or more.
It is to be noted, however, that the act of 1899 provided for
the making of certain kinds of payments out of the county
treasury without appropriation by the council. Moreover,
various statutes enacted since that date have conferred power
upon the county board, with respect to certain specific mat-
ters, to make levies, spend money without council appropria-
tion, borrow without council authorization, and buy and sell
property without action by the council. Some of these excep-
tions, however, have been of only temporary duration, and
those in existence at the present time are of relatively minor
importance.
96 County taxes are levied and county appropriations made in Massachu-
setts by the state legislature, and in New Hampshire and Connecticut by
conventions composed of the members of the state legislature from the re-
spective counties. John A. Fairlie and Charles M. Kneier, "County Govern-
ment and Administration" (New York, 1930), p. 111. In South Carolina,
county levies and appropriations are made by the state legislature under a
system of reciprocal "courtesy" between the respective county legislative dele-
gations which results in those delegations being the bodies which in fact
control county finance. Columbus Andrews, "Administrative County Govern-
ment in South Carolina" (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1933), passim.
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The county council is frequently referred to as "the legis-
lative body" of the Indiana county. It must be remembered
in this connection, however, that the legislative or policy-
determining powers of the county are very limited in their
scope, the county, as a quasi corporation, serving primarily
as a mere administrative unit for the carrying out of policies
decreed by the General Assembly and only secondarily as a
unit of local self-government. Moreover, subject to the fiscal
control vested in the council, it is still the board of county
commissioners which determines, so for as such determination
devolves upon the county at all, what functions shall be under-
taken by the county and how they shall be performed. That
the council is not to be considered as the general legislative
body of the county seems apparent from the fact, among
others, that the General Assembly, when it enacted a county-
planning law in 1935, conferred the power of adopting plan-
ning and zoning ordinances, not upon the council but upon
the board of county commissioners.97 It may be true, of
course, that control of the purse is ultimately the determining
factor in the formulation of policy, but, in view of the con-
siderations just mentioned, it seems hardly proper to designate
the council as the legislative body of the county.
COMPOSITION
The council consists of seven members, three being elected
from the county at large and one from each of four council-
manic districts into which the county is divided by the board
of county commissioners. Members are elected at the general
November election in the even- non-Presidential year. Their
term is four years, beginning on the tenth day after their
election. Vacancies are filled by the council itself, the person
elected to fill a vacancy serving for the unexpired term.98
ORGANIZATION AND SESSION
A newly-elected council meets on the second Saturday after
its election for the purpose of organization and the perform-
98 Burns, 1933, secs. 26-502, 26-505.07 Laws of Indiana, 1935, ch. 239.
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ance of such other business as may come before it. At this
meeting the council chooses one of its members as presiding
officer and another as presiding officer pro tem, these officers
serving for the term of their offices as councilmen. The
county auditor is clerk to the council.09
The council holds a regular annual session on the first
Tuesday after the first Monday in September for the purpose
of fixing the county tax rate and making appropriations.
Special sessions may be called by the county auditor or by a
majority of the members of the council, the statutes prescrib-
ing the method by which notice of such sessions shall be
given to council members and to the general public.100
During the year of 1935, four special sessions of the coun-
cil were held in Fountain County, six in Monroe County, and
eight in Marion County. 101 In most counties of the state,
however, the number of special sessions probably does not
normally exceed two or three in any year.
Council meetings are open to the public. A quorum con-
sists of a majority of the members, but the passage of or-
dinances requires in every case at least a majority vote of
all the members, and in certain cases an extraordinary ma-
jority.10 2
COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS
Members of the council receive, as compensation for their
services, ten, fifteen, or twenty dollars annually, depending
99Ibid., secs. 26-507, 26-509.
100 Ibid., sec. 26-507.
101County Council Record, Fountain County, Indiana, ibid., Marion
County, Indiana, data for Monroe County supplied by Dr. Pressly S. Sikes,
Department of Government, Indiana University. The number of special
sessions in Monroe County ordinarily does not exceed two in any year, the
larger number in 1935 being occasioned by the construction of a new jail.
Likewise, one of the special sessions in Fountain County was held for the
purpose of authorizing the issuance of bonds for the construction of a new
courthouse. The number of sessions in Marion seems to be about normal
for that county, or perhaps slightly below the average.
102 Burns, 1933, secs. 26-508, 26-511. For examples of ordinances requir-
ing an extraordinary vote, see infra, "Functions-Making Appropriations."
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upon the population of the county, plus ten dollars per day
while serving at special sessions. 10 3
FORMS OF ACTION
As in the case of city councils, action by the county council
may take either of two forms, viz., the ordinance or the
resolution. While the distinction between these two forms
of action is not always clearly drawn it is well settled that
the ordinance is the higher and more authoritative form.
The courts have held that the word "ordinance", as used
in the County Reform Law, means an instrument in writing
-something more than a mere verbal motion subsequently
reduced to writing by a secretary or clerk. Where the statutes
provide for action by ordinance, as they do with respect to
various matters such as the levying of taxes, the making of
appropriations, and the authorization of borrowing, action
can be taken only by ordinance; in such cases, a mere motion
or resolution will not suffice. 10 4 If the statutes prescribe the
procedure to be followed in the adoption of ordinances, the
statutory requirements must be observed by the council or
any action taken will be void. Thus, the courts have held
the requirements that appropriation and taxing ordinances be
read on two separate days, and that the ayes and nays be
taken and recorded on every vote for the appropriation of
money or the fixing of tax rate, to be mandatory. Unless
these requirements are complied with, and unless the record
shows such compliance, the ordinance is invalid. Moreover,
if the record fails to show compliance, no presumption will
be entertained that the requirements have been met.10 5 Since
the ordinance is a higher form of action than the resolution,
an ordinance cannot be rescinded or repealed by resolution.106
103 Burns, 1933, sec. 26-503. The salary is ten dollars in counties of 35,000
population or less; fifteen in counties of more than 35,000 and not more than
75,000; and twenty in counties of over 75,000.
104State v. Board of Commissioners, 165 Ind. 262, 74 N. E. 1091 (1905).
105 Van Der Veer v. State, 97 Ind. App. 1, 165 N. E. 265 (1929).
106 Kraus v. Lehman, 170 Ind. 408, 83 N. E. 714, petition for rehearing
84 N. E. 769 (1908).
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An examination of the Council Record in representative coun-
ties indicates that action is usually taken by ordinance whether
that form of action is required by statute or not, action by
resolution being relatively rare.
FUNCTION
Making dppropriations
The statutes authorize payment out of the county treasury,
without appropriation by the county council, of: (1) money
belonging to the state and commanded by law to be paid into
the state treasury; (2) money belonging to any school fund;
(3) money belonging to any township, town, or city, and com-
manded by law to be paid thereto; (4) money paid into the
county treasury pursuant to public improvement assessments
upon persons or property in territory less than that of the
whole county; (5) "money due to any person, company or
corporation, which has been paid into the treasury to redeem
from any tax or other sale; or . . . money so due that has
been paid in pursuant to authority of law as a tender or pay-
ment to the person, company or corporation"; (6) taxes
erroneously paid; and (7) "money which any statute expressly
provides shall be paid for a purpose therein stated out of the
county treasury without being first appropriated for such pur-
pose by the -county council." In all other instances, before
money can be paid from the treasury, there must exist an
unexhausted appropriation therefor made by the council for
the year in which the payment is made.107
It must not be inferred, however, from the fact that the
council is the appropriating body of the county that it may
therefore appropriate county funds for any purpose and to
any amount without restriction. On the contrary, the appro-
priating power of the council is strictly limited; appropria-
tions may be made only as authorized by law, and any appro-
priation contrary to law is void.'08 Moreover, it is entirely
107Laws of Indiana, 1935, ch. 110. The act excepts from its provisions
certain funds received from the state or the federal government for relief,
public works, and similar purposes.
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within the power of the General Assembly to require the
council to make specific appropriations and, where this has
been done and the council fails or refuses to act, mandamus
will lie to compel the council to perform its statutory duty.109
The annual county budget is adopted by the council at its
regular September session, upon the basis of estimates sub-
mitted by the various county agencies and compiled by the
auditor for presentation to the council. The statutes pro-
vide that if "an emergency should arise" for additional appro-
priations after the adjournment of the annual session of the
council, such additional appropriations may be made at a
special session, by two-thirds vote of all the council members,
upon estimates prepared and presented in the same manner
as that prescribed for regular appropriations. 110 The courts
have held that, under this provision, the council's determina-
tion that an emergency exists requiring additional appropria-
tions is not conclusive, but is reviewable by the judicial branch
of government.' By the terms of an enactment of 1935,
all additional appropriations, made after the adoption of the
regular annual budget, must have the approval of the State
Board of Tax Commissioners. 12
Levying Taxes
It is the duty of the council to levy annually, within the
limits imposed by law, a tax sufficient to cover the current
running expenses of the county, including payment of tem-
porary loans and interest on county indebtedness, together
108See Burns, 1933, sec. 26-529; Daily v. Board of Commissioners, 165
Ind. 99, 74 N. E. 977 (1905). An appropriation by the council to pay a
claim illegally allowed by the board of commissioners does not validate the
claim. Caldwell v. Board of Commissioners, 41 Ind. App. 40, 83 N. E. 355
(190s).
109 State v. Meeker, 182 Ind. 240, 105 N. E. 906 (1914); State v. Stein-
wedel, 203 Ind. 457, 180 N. E. 865 (1932). With respect to control of county
and township officials by mandamus, see infra, ch. XIII, "Judicial Control-
Special Writs."
11OBurns, 1933, sec. 26-521.
111 State v. Board of Commissioners, 204 Ind. 434, 184 N. E. 780 (1933).
112Laws of Indiana, 1935, ch. 150.
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with any current deficit which may have been incurred. If the
county has bonded indebtedness, it is also the duty of the
council to make a sinking fund levy for the ultimate liquida-
tion of such indebtedness." 3 At one time, statutes requiring
local governmental units to impose levies of at least a cer-
tain minimum rate for specific purposes were quite common,
but in 1931, as an economy measure, the General Assembly
enacted a statute repealing all of these mandatory minimum
levies. 114  It must be remembered, however, that mandatory
expenditures, such as county salaries fixed by statute, have
the same practical effect as mandatory levies. Moreover,
while the county council is free from the requirement that
it imposes certain minimum levies, it is drastically limited as
to the maximum levies it may impose by the provisions of
the recently-enacted tax limitation law which specifies that
the total tax rate for all taxing units shall not, except in case
of an emergency declared by the county board of tax adjust-
ment, exceed one dollar on each hundred dollars of assessed
valuation outside incorporated cities and towns, or one dollar
and fifty cents per hundred dollars of valuation within incor-
porated cities or towns.
A"uthorizing Incurring of Indebtedness
The state constitution limits the borrowing power of coun-
ties, as of other "political or municipal" corporations, to two
per cent of the assessed valuation of taxable property, and
the General Assembly has provided that county indebtedness
may not exceed two per cent of the county's assessed valua-
tion less mortgage exemptions." 5 Within this limit, the coun-
113 Burns, 1933, sec. 26-532.
114Ibzd., secs. 64-1334-64-1336. This act did not, however, affect those
laws requiring school corporations to impose certain minimum levies in order
to qualify for state aid. It is also to be noted that a few statutory provisions
requiring the imposition of local levies upon petition therefor are still in
effect. See "Mandatory Salaries, Tax Levies and Appropriations in Local
Governments in Indiana" (Mimeographed Bulletin, Indiana Legislative Bureau,
Mar., 1932).
115 "Constitution of Indiana," art. XIII, sec. 1, Burns, 1933, sec. 26-532.
Owners of mortgaged real estate are entitled to deduct the amount of the
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cil may authorize the issuance of bonds or other obligations
of the county, negotiable or otherwise, bearing not to exceed
six per cent interest, and running not to exceed twenty years.
Bonds may be issued for any lawful corporate purpose except
the payment of current expenses, and may, if the council sees
fit, be made to mature serially. The ordinance authorizing
the issuance of bonds must state the purpose for which the
bonds are issued.116
It should be noted, in this connection, that the county
council need not approve the issuance of bonds to pay for
the construction of roads financed by special assessment, or
for those constructed under the Three-Mile Gravel Road Law
or the County-Unit Road Law. All such bonds, although
issued by the board of county commissioners in the name of
the county and commonly referred to as "county bonds", are
technically obligations not of the county but of special tax-
ing districts. Even county-unit road bonds, according to the
courts, are not bonds of the county such as require the ap-
proval of the county council, but are obligations of a special
taxing district coextensive with the county and payable by a
tax levy upon such districts.1 17
The council is empowered to authorize temporary loans
in anticipation of revenue for the purpose of meeting cur-
rent expenses, but such loans may not exceed the revenue for
the current year. An act of 1933 provides that temporary
loans of this character shall take the form of tax-anticipa-
tion notes or warrants bearing interest at a rate not to exceed
six per cent. The ordinance authorizing the issuance of such
notes or warrants must appropriate and pledge to the punctual
mortgage indebtedness from the assessed valuation of the property for pur-
poses of taxation, provided that the deduction is not greater than one-half
the assessed valuation of the property and does not exceed in any case, the
sum of one thousand dollars. Burns, 1933, sec. 64-209.
116Burns, 1938, see. 26-532. See, as to borrowing for poor relief pur-
poses, Laws of Indiana, 1935, ch. 117. Bonds and other evidences of in-
debtedness issued by local governmental units must be approved by the State
Board of Tax Commissioners if the rate of interest exceeds five per cent.
Burns, 1933, sec. 64-1332.
117 Hull v. Board of Commissioners, 195 Ind. 150, 143 N. E. 589 (1924).
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payment thereof, from the current revenues in anticipation of
which they are issued, a sum sufficient to extinguish the in-
debtedness. Such notes or warrants, which are tax-exempt,
are to be sold by the auditor to the highest bidder, after
proper notice of the sale thereof has been published. In no
case, however, may they be sold for less than par and accrued
interest." 8
Authorizing Sale and Purchase of Real Estate
The fourth function conferred upon the council by the
County Reform Law is that of approving the purchase and
sale of real estate. With certain minor exceptions which
have been created by subsequent enactments, no purchase or
sale of real estate may be made by the county, where the
value is one thousand dollars or more, until the council has,
by ordinance, authorized such sale or purchase and fixed the
term and conditions thereof.119
Fixing Compensation of Deputy Officers
Under the recently-enacted county salary law, it is made
the duty of the council to fix, within limits prescribed by the
statute, the compensation of deputies and assistants appointed
by the various county officers. 120
Functions Shared With the County Board
A few functions are conferred by statute upon the board
of commissioners and council jointly. Thus, the two agencies,
acting together: approve the acceptance of lands given or
devised to the county for purposes of a public forest; hold
hearings on petitions for the condemnation of school buildings
as unfit for use, and decide for or against such condemnation,
118Burns, 1933, secs. 26-532, 26-1022. For legislation of 1933 authorizing
the re-funding of maturing obligations, see ibid., secs. 26-1015-26-1021,
61-501--61-507.
119 Ibid., see. 26-534. For an exception, see ibid., secs. 26-2201-26-2210.
120Laws of Indiana, 1935, ch. 84. This law, amended by the 1935 statute,
was first enacted in 1933.
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subject to appeal to the circuit or superior court; and de-
termine, upon proper petition, the order in which county high-
way projects shall be established and constructed, in the event
that two or more petitions for such projects are on file with
the auditor at the same time.121
121Burns, 1933, secs. 28-3001-28-3006, 32-105, 36-327-36-331.
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